DIGITAL LIFE
How to ensure that smartphones have not been tampered with during the manufacturing process?
Researchers from the American Institute of Physics’ publishing arm have developed a technique that could change how smartphones are inspected for tampering and hidden modifications. Instead of physically examining a device, the team demonstrated a way to detect whether a smartphone has been altered using radio-frequency signals from a distance.
The work introduces what researchers describe as a robust over-the-air testing platform that analyzes how a smartphone’s radio hardware behaves when it communicates wirelessly. The idea is surprisingly simple. Every phone’s radio components produce a unique “fingerprint” when transmitting signals. If a device has been modified, damaged, or compromised, that fingerprint changes in subtle but measurable ways.
With the rise in cyberattacks and government data breaches, one of the most important devices to keep secure is the one in everyone's pocket: the smartphone. The problem is that it's difficult to verify that a smartphone hasn't been tampered with without the risk of accidentally damaging it.
In a paper published in AIP Advances, researchers from the University of Colorado at Boulder and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) have developed a way to remotely identify a cellular device. The method can help ensure that a phone has not been altered during the manufacturing process, reducing the risk of espionage.
When smartphones communicate with a cell tower, they emit a set of electromagnetic waves. Using specialized SIM cards and base station emulator equipment compatible with cellular radio standards, researchers commanded a set of "trusted" cell phones—devices they know haven't been modified—to transmit exactly the same sets of signals, allowing them to create a database of what those signals actually look like for different phone models, serving as model fingerprints.
"Imagine that each cell phone receives exactly the same song to sing. Even if they sing the same notes, each model has tiny microscopic differences in its internal hardware," said author Améya Ramadurgakar. "Our system is sensitive enough to detect these subtle 'vocal' differences."
By comparing the signals emitted by an unknown device with the database, the researchers can determine if the device has been tampered with—that is, if its signals don't match any of the trusted fingerprints.
They tested this process on several commercially available, high-end smartphones from all the major manufacturers leading the national market, with an accuracy exceeding 95%.
These results were repeatable and stable over time. Because the method focuses on the fundamental electromagnetic behavior of the hardware, it is not limited to current 4G and 5G mobile networks and could be extended to future generations of cellular technologies.
Ramadurgakar stated that this method lays the groundwork for the testing framework of the National Metrology Institute. To formalize this solution, researchers need to expand their library of reliable sources that account for small potential variations between manufacturing batches, develop standardized test conditions, and a more automated process.
"This work demonstrates a fundamental approach to obtaining a high-definition, reliable, and stable digital fingerprint of a commercially available smartphone in order to verify that it has not been tampered with or compromised before its distribution," said Ramadurgakar.
"I see this being used to validate mobile hardware before it is delivered to high-security users, such as the military chain of command or the highest levels of government."
Provided by American Institute of Physics
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