TECH

Researcher finds six previously unknown vulnerabilities in AirDrop and Quick Share
A new study from CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security reports six pre-authentication vulnerabilities across Apple AirDrop and Google/Samsung Quick Share, the proximity file-transfer protocols that the paper says run on more than 5 billion devices. Most of the flaws let a nearby attacker crash a device or manipulate the transfer protocol rather than steal files, and one bug in the Windows version of Quick Share earned a Google bounty.
The paper, posted to Aviatrix on June 25, 2026 by Arash Ale Ebrahim and Nils Ole Tippenhauer, describes what the authors call the first cross-platform reverse engineering and protocol-aware fuzzing study of both stacks. Earlier academic work on AirDrop focused mostly on privacy and the underlying wireless link layer; the application layer that actually parses incoming files had not been examined in this depth, according to the authors.
Their work uncovered six distinct flaws: three in Apple's AirDrop (and the shared frameworks beneath it), two in Samsung's Quick Share implementation, and one in Google's Quick Share for Windows. The vulnerabilities affect specific implementations and versions rather than the entire five-billion-device ecosystem uniformly, but the affected components are foundational to how these features operate.
1. Apple AirDrop...Researchers discovered three vulnerabilities affecting the shared service that powers AirDrop, AirPlay, Handoff, and other Continuity features. A malformed request could repeatedly crash the service when AirDrop is set to "Everyone," while a separate flaw in Apple's shared Foundation framework could affect multiple apps and operating systems that process untrusted XML property lists.
2. Samsung Quick Share...Two vulnerabilities allowed attackers to bypass parts of Quick Share's authentication process, enabling unauthorised devices on the same Wi-Fi network to manipulate connections before or after encryption was established. Although researchers did not demonstrate file theft, the flaws weakened the protocol's built-in security guarantees.
3. Google Quick Share for Windows...The most severe flaw was a use-after-free memory vulnerability that could potentially be exploited for remote code execution because Windows Control Flow Guard was disabled. Researchers confirmed the crash but did not develop a working exploit. The finding also highlights a recurring pattern, with similar vulnerabilities repeatedly discovered in the same Quick Share component despite previous patches.
The response Gap:
Apple (AirDrop): Three vulnerabilities were discovered. One has been patched and assigned a CVE (although the security advisory has not yet been published), while the remaining two are still undergoing coordinated disclosure.
Samsung (Quick Share): Two vulnerabilities were reported to Google and are currently under investigation.
Google (Quick Share for Windows): One vulnerability was reported through Google's bug bounty program. The researcher received a bounty, the fix has been released, and a CVE assignment is pending.
No public reports of in-the-wild exploitation have surfaced as of this writing. Apple's broader security update, iOS and macOS 26.5.2, shipped June 29 and includes relevant fixes.
The timing is notable: Google's AirDrop interoperability for Quick Share is rolling out across flagship Android phones, and it only works when the iPhone is set to receive from “Everyone”, the exact setting that exposes the crash bugs. Cross-platform convenience is arriving at the same moment researchers are exposing its risks.
What users and developers should do...Apple users: Install the latest update (iOS/macOS 26.5.2 or newer), and set AirDrop to “Contacts Only” or off entirely rather than “Everyone.”
Quick Share (Android/Windows) users: Keep visibility out of “Everyone” mode except when actively receiving a file, and update the Windows Quick Share app now that Google's fix has landed.
Developers: Any Apple-platform app that parses untrusted XML property list files should be reviewed, since the stack-overflow bug lives in Foundation, not just AirDrop. Windows developers with similar connection-handling logic should audit for race conditions around session and encryption setup, particularly where Control Flow Guard or equivalent protections are disabled.
Six vulnerabilities...The researchers catalog six issues they label V1 through V6. Three sit in Apple AirDrop: a denial-of-service crash in the code that routes incoming web requests (V1), a stack overflow triggered by deeply nested XML data in Apple's Foundation framework (V2), and a null-pointer crash in Apple's networking framework (V3). The paper says V2 reaches beyond AirDrop, because any Apple app that parses untrusted XML property lists uses the same vulnerable code, spanning macOS, iOS, watchOS, tvOS, and visionOS.
Two more affect Samsung's Quick Share: the service begins processing protocol messages before the secure handshake finishes (V4), and three of seven message types are accepted after the handshake without the required encryption wrapper (V5). The sixth, and the most serious by the paper's own rating, is a use-after-free in Google Quick Share for Windows caused by a race condition in how the software tracks connecting devices (V6).
The authors are careful about impact. They classify V1 through V5 as denial-of-service or protocol-state manipulation, not remote code execution. The team writes that it tested at least ten ways to skip the user-acceptance prompt and silently pull files onto a target device, and that all of them were rejected, because the auto-accept decision is tied to a hardware-bound Apple ID certificate an attacker cannot forge. In other words, the AirDrop findings are about knocking the service over and disrupting Apple's Continuity features, not quietly receiving files.
The paper describes the Windows use-after-free as a classic vtable-hijack pattern and says exploitation is plausible, noting that Control Flow Guard is disabled in the affected binary. The authors say they confirmed the crash and that Google awarded a bounty, with a CVE identifier pending. They state they did not develop a full working exploit.
Wireless...The threat model in the paper is an attacker within wireless range, typically 10 to 30 meters, using a commodity laptop and no prior relationship with the target. Exposure depends on settings. AirDrop is reachable this way when set to "Everyone for 10 Minutes," and Quick Share when the device is visible to nearby devices. The researchers note that crowded places such as airports, transit hubs, and conferences would let a single attacker reach many devices at once.
According to the paper, all six issues were reported through the vendors' coordinated disclosure channels. Apple acknowledged V1 through V3 and has fixes in progress, with no CVEs assigned yet. Samsung passed V4 and V5 to Google after determining the affected code originates in Google's Nearby and Quick Share components; those two remain under investigation. Google acknowledged the Windows use-after-free, paid a bounty, and a CVE is pending. The team also released its fuzzing tool, called AirFuzz, along with reproduction artifacts on Zenodo.
Researchers have identified six new vulnerabilities (V1 through V6) in the proximity-based file-sharing protocols AirDrop (Apple) and Quick Share (Android/Samsung/Windows), which allow for "zero-click" attacks—attacks that require no user interaction—within wireless range. The study, detailed in the paper "Protocol Prying" on arXiv and covered by Tech Xplore, utilized reverse engineering and a fuzzing tool called AirFuzz to test these implementations.
Key flaws discovered:
• AirDrop (macOS and iOS — V1 to V3): Three pre-authentication denial-of-service (DoS) vulnerabilities capable of crashing system services, including AirDrop itself, AirPlay, and Handoff. These include a fatal Swift error in the HTTP path router (V1), unlimited recursion within an XML plist in the Foundation framework (V2), and a null pointer dereference in the Network.framework’s HTTP/1.1 parser (V3).
• Quick Share on Samsung (V4 and V5): Two flaws in the protocol layer that allow for the pre-authentication processing of "OfflineFrame" frames (V4) and the bypassing of D2D (device-to-device) encryption for three types of frames (V5).
• Quick Share on Windows (V6): A heap-based "use-after-free" vulnerability in the Google application for Windows, which could potentially lead to remote code execution; this finding was rewarded through a bug bounty program.
How to protect yourself:
• Keep your iOS, macOS, and Android systems, as well as the Samsung app and Quick Share for Windows, up to date.
• Disable AirDrop and Quick Share when they are not in use, and avoid setting your visibility to "Everyone" while in public spaces.
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