Monday, September 21, 2026

 

TECH


Reliable leaker contradicts Moore's Law Is Dead's Nvidia RTX 6090 release date

We have seen conflicting rumors regarding the release date of the Nvidia GeForce RTX 6090 based on the Nvidia Rubin architecture. Serial leaker kopite7kimi, who is generally quite reliable, has now provided some clarification on the RTX 6090 release date.

A few days ago, Moore’s Law Is Dead leaked that Nvidia was planning to kickstart the launch of the next-gen GeForce RTX 60 series GPUs in H1 2027. Utilizing the Rubin GPU architecture, MLID claimed that “milestones leading up to a 2027 launch” were put in place months ago. So, the leaker alleged that the RTX 6090 release date could fall sometime in H1 2027. This rumor caused quite a stir online, and kopite7kimi has now sounded off on the subject.

kopite7kimi reports on X that, while they hope “Jensen can see everyone's passion and launch new products for gaming as soon as possible”, the GR20X Rubin gaming GPUs won’t be here until 2028. The GR20X is a “2028 product” as Nvidia has delayed the launch once again, per kopite7kimi.

This directly contradicts MLID’s report which alleged that people assuming a 2028 RTX 60 series launch are “just WRONG”. MLID’s Nvidia source claimed that the RTX 6090 was originally targeting 2026 but was delayed to allow Nvidia to use as much TSMC capacity as possible for AI chips.

Many leakers opposed MLID’s RTX 6090 release date leak, including Jukan who calls the rumor ridiculous and suggests that there is “no way Rubin gaming GPUs are coming out that soon”.

Looking at the current state of the consumer tech market, we don’t see much hope of an H1 2027 RTX 60 series launch. DRAM and storage price are still sky high and the situation is unlikely to resolve in the near term. We don’t think Nvidia is stupid enough to launch new GPUs in a market where gamers can’t upgrade within a reasonable budget. We could be wrong though. So, all we can do is wait and watch.

Kepler_L2 refutes recent RTX 6090 rumours...KeplerL2, a prominent PC hardware leaker, has refuted recent claims that Nvidia’s RTX 60 series would arrive in 2027. A recent report from Moore’s Law is Dead, citing an unnamed Nvidia source, claimed Nvidia was “aiming for H1 2027” for its “Gaming Rubin” (RTX 60 series) GPUs. KeplerL2 wasn’t the first to call out this report, with MEGAsizeGPU also calling it “Fake-as-hell”.

If KeplerL2 is right, Nvidia won’t release its RTX 60 series graphics cards before 2028. This lines up with prior expectations for Nvidia’s next-generation graphics cards. Until very recently, Nvidia were reportedly working on RTX 50 SUPER series graphics cards, upgraded RTX 50 series GPU models with refreshed specifications. Typically, Nvidia waits at least a year between major gaming product launches, which would place their RTX 60 series launch in 2028.

Supply chain concerns ultimately scuppered Nvidia’s RTX 50 SUPER series gaming ambitions. High memory demand makes it hard to launch any new product that requires lots of memory. These same concerns would make launching RTX 60 series GPUs a challenge. If anything, the RTX 60 series would be even more challenging, given the heightened demand seen for next-generation gaming products.

And there are already conflicting reports about when the RTX 60 series will actually arrive.

Earlier rumours suggested Nvidia could launch the RTX 60 series in the second half of 2027, while other reports have pointed towards an even later release.

Adding even more uncertainty to the story, well-known GPU leaker MEGAsizeGPU has pushed back against the latest report, calling it a fake rumour and pointing towards Nvidia’s ongoing supply-chain problems. That makes the alleged first-half 2027 launch far from certain.

Nvidia itself has also yet to announce anything regarding the RTX 60 series or an RTX 6090, so for now, everything surrounding the next generation remains firmly in rumour territory.

If Nvidia really is targeting the first half of 2027, we could potentially hear more about the RTX 60 series at an event such as GTC or Computex next year. But until Nvidia actually confirms its plans, I’d take this particular rumour with a very large pinch of salt.

For now, the RTX 6090 isn’t official, and there is no confirmed release date, pricing or specifications.

Considering how much the GPU market has changed over the past year, Nvidia’s next-generation cards could be very interesting. The bigger question is whether Nvidia can actually produce enough of them at a price that makes sense for gamers.

mundophone


DIGITAL LIFE


Sánchez: AI companies "will never align with the public interest"

Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez used a meeting with his ministers to comment on Artificial Intelligence—specifically regarding recent developments in the tech world and statements made by leaders of companies in this sector.

At issue are calls from these leaders for greater regulation, which Sánchez interpreted as a possible tactic to secure funding. In the Spanish leader's view, stories about AI models acting on their own initiative might simply be intended to showcase just how advanced the technology has become.

"I believe the risks of uncontrolled Artificial Intelligence are becoming increasingly evident. We see this in numerous news reports about cybersecurity issues stemming from certain applications or models compared to others," Sánchez stated. "But what may also be at play is a strategy by some of these major companies to seek out and attract funding. In short, whatever the case, what is clear is that safety must be an absolute priority in this regard as well."

Regarding safety, Sánchez emphasized the need to "strengthen cyber protection" and to "increase oversight of the most aggressive models."

Sánchez also addressed the topic of regulation, stating that "self-regulation does not work"—a lesson taught by history.

The Spanish head of government recalled William Vanderbilt, a key figure in the expansion of US railways in the late 19th century, who famously declared: "The public be damned. I work only for my shareholders." “I think that phrase symbolizes many things, but what I would like to highlight is that it exemplifies, perhaps better than almost any other, the spirit of that era: the arrogance of a class that believed itself to be above everything and everyone. The only regulation it accepted was that which might originate from within itself—never from public authorities, whom, incidentally, this statement made clear they held in contempt,” noted Sánchez.

Drawing a parallel with the present day, Sánchez argued that such regulation must come from the state itself; one cannot expect companies to act against their own interests.

“The incentives of the few who control cutting-edge industries will never align with the public interest, no matter how much they try to convince us otherwise,” declared Sánchez.

What is the IA360 Plan...The IA360 Plan seeks to address artificial intelligence from all its angles: economic, labor, educational, technological, and regulatory. Hence the reference to the “360 degrees” of its name.

The strategy is structured around four major objectives: to reach a national agreement on the implementation of artificial intelligence, to strengthen Spain's own technological capacity, to make AI an economic engine and a talent creator, as well as to improve regulation, supervision, and cybersecurity.

The central idea is that Spain should not be limited to consuming tools developed by large foreign companies, but should have infrastructure, its own models, trained workers, and rules to control how this technology is used.

A “new social contract” for artificial intelligence...Sánchez has announced that the Government will summon social agents next month —mainly business organizations and unions— to advance in a “major national agreement” on artificial intelligence. The objective is to anticipate the changes that AI will cause in the labor market. Technology can automate tasks, modify professions, increase productivity, and create new jobs, but it can also displace workers, increase surveillance in companies, or introduce algorithms in decisions such as hiring, performance evaluation, or layoffs.

The agreement aims to provide security to workers and establish shared rules on issues such as: the adaptation of jobs, the training and reskilling of employees, the use of algorithms within companies, the protection of labor rights, the distribution of productivity gains, and the transition of the most exposed sectors and professions.

It is not, for now, a closed labor reform nor a new concrete law. The Government proposes to open a dialogue process with employers and unions to build what Sánchez has defined as a “new social contract” for artificial intelligence.

The president has defended that this consensus must also incorporate workers, political parties, public administrations, and other sectors of society.

An observatory will study the impact of AI on employment...The IA360 Plan includes the creation of a permanent observatory on artificial intelligence and the labor market. Its function will be to analyze how the implementation of this technology evolves and what effects it produces on employment.

This body must help determine what tasks are being automated, what professions are changing, where jobs are being destroyed or created, and what new skills workers need. The purpose is to have updated information to adopt measures before technological changes generate imbalances that are difficult to correct.

Sectoral tables will also be established to study the necessary transitions in areas such as education, the financial system, the labor market, or culture.

In this last case, the Government foresees a specific table with representatives from the cultural sector to analyze the effect of artificial intelligence on creation, authors' rights, and the economic value of content.

A gigafactory to reinforce technological autonomy...The second axis of the IA360 Plan consists of reinforcing Spain's “technological muscle.” One of its main projects will be the candidacy to host one of the seven gigafactories of artificial intelligence planned by the European Union.

An AI gigafactory is a large infrastructure equipped with thousands of advanced processors, enormous storage capacities, and high-speed networks. It allows training and executing large-scale artificial intelligence models without completely relying on the technological centers of the United States or China.

The plan also includes the development, together with the Barcelona Supercomputing Center, of models intended for specific applications in areas such as health, energy, the fight against the climate emergency, and the improvement of public services.

Sánchez has added that the new data centers must meet demanding environmental and energy standards, respect natural resources, protect data autonomy, and generate benefits for the territories where they are installed.

The goal: for half of SMEs to use generative AI by 2030...The third axis aims to extend the use of artificial intelligence beyond large companies. The goal set by the Government is that half of the small and medium-sized Spanish enterprises integrate generative AI into their processes before 2030.

In practice, this may mean using it to automate administrative tasks, serve customers, analyze information, prepare budgets, optimize production, or design new products. The challenge is to avoid a gap between large companies, which have the resources to adopt these technologies, and small businesses, which may face more economic and technical difficulties.

The Government links this objective to training. The IA360 Plan foresees adapting the curricula of Secondary Education and Vocational Training so that young people learn to use AI responsibly and productively, without these tools harming their learning.

More control over the most advanced artificial intelligence models...The fourth block of the plan focuses on governance and security. Sánchez has announced the strengthening of the Spanish “cybersecurity shield” and greater oversight of the so-called frontier models.

These are the most powerful and advanced artificial intelligence systems, capable of performing complex tasks and which, precisely because of their capability, may present greater risks if used to launch cyberattacks, spread misinformation, or make decisions without sufficient controls.

The president has called for artificial intelligence with oversight and traceability. That is, systems whose operation can be monitored and whose decisions can be reconstructed or explained, especially when used in areas where public interest is at stake.

AI companies may never fully align with the public interest primarily because their core financial incentives conflict with societal well-being. While public interest prioritizes safety, equity, job stability, and truth, commercial AI development is driven by a market structure that rewards speed, data collection, and profit maximization.This inherent tension is often described by tech critics, economists, and ethics researchers through several key arguments:

1. The profit incentive vs. public good:

Shareholder Primacy: As heavily funded corporations or venture-backed startups, AI companies have a legal and financial duty to maximize returns for investors. When safety testing or ethical guardrails slow down product launches, profit incentives usually win.

The "Move Fast and Break Things" Culture: Silicon Valley relies on being first to market to capture monopoly-like market share. This race discourages the slow, deliberate auditing required to ensure a technology does not harm the public.

2. Data and privacy exploitation:

Surveillance Capitalism: The business model of modern AI relies on scraping massive amounts of data, often without explicit consent, compensation, or regard for individual privacy.

Value Extraction: AI systems train on the collective knowledge, art, and writing of the public to create commercial products that could ultimately automate away the very livelihoods of the people who created that data.

3. Asymmetry of power and accountability:

Regulatory Capture: Tech giants have massive lobbying budgets. They often influence legislation to protect their own market positions rather than to protect consumers, effectively writing the rules of their own oversight

Lack of Democratic Input: Decisions about what AI models are built, what biases they contain, and how they deploy automated systems are made behind closed doors by a small group of tech executives, rather than through democratic or public processes

4. Externalization of costs:

AI companies capture the massive financial profits of automation while shifting the negative consequences onto society:

Misinformation: Maximizing user engagement often means algorithmic feeds promote sensationalist, AI-generated disinformation, damaging democratic discourse.

Environmental Impact: Running massive data centers requires immense amounts of water and energy, contributing heavily to carbon emissions while the public bears the climate costs.

Economic Disruption: Rapid job displacement affects workers and state social safety nets, while the wealth generated by AI concentrates into fewer hands.



Miguel Dias

Sunday, September 20, 2026


TECH


AMD report says Zen 6 EPYC Venice smokes NVIDIA Vera in revised agentic AI benchmarks

AMD has updated its performance estimates for its upcoming 6th Gen EPYC 9006 "Venice" server CPUs, and the latest numbers make an aggressive case against Intel and NVIDIA in high-density data center workloads. A new AMD white paper, titled "AMD EPYC Server CPU Architecture And Performance Overview" revises the company's modeling for Venice and compares the 256-core EPYC 9996 against Intel's 128-core Xeon 6980P and NVIDIA's 88-core Vera CPU.

The updated analysis places particular priority on agentic AI infrastructure, where CPUs handle tasks such as orchestration, databases, web services, caching, APIs, retrieval, and other work surrounding accelerator-based AI inference. This work is now comprising a larger and larger percentage of the actual workload of Agentic AI, reinforcing the role of CPUs in the datacenter, once thought to merely be orchestration for GPUs that do all the 'real' work.

AMD expects that the EPYC 9996 will deliver 2.4× the performance of Xeon 6980P in server-side Java, 2.5× in OpenSSL, 3.5× in MongoDB with YCSB, 2.9× in Redis Benchmark, 3.7× in NGINX with WRK, and 2.6× in transaction processing based on TPC-C. Those results are normalized to a 128-core Xeon 6980P system and represent the CPU-heavy enterprise and cloud-native portions of an agentic AI infrastructure stack. Notably, Vera was not included in this modeling, but not because AMD didn't have numbers to compare against.

Besides, the more eye-catching update comes at the rack level. AMD has revisited its earlier 100-kW rack-capacity model from June, which estimated how much aggregate workload throughput each platform could deliver within a fixed rack-level power envelope. The company says the previous analysis put 5th Gen EPYC 9965 at 2.37× the rack-level throughput of its NVIDIA Vera baseline. The revised study now models the 6th Gen EPYC 9996 at 3.4× Vera's rack-level performance.

This is partially because the underlying methodology has changed. AMD's earlier rack estimate was based on a six-workload geometric mean that included SPECrate 2017 Int, while the updated model incorporates SPECrate 2026 Int, server-side Java, NGINX, Redis, Memcached, and TPROC-C. That makes the latest figure a refreshed model rather than simply adding Venice to the old chart. There's also a small but interesting change for AMD's previous-generation part. The earlier 9965 estimate was 2.37× Vera, while the new chart shows the 9965 at about 2.3× in the revised model. In other words, AMD appears to have rerun the calculations rather than simply carrying its previous numbers forward.

However, it's critical to keep in mind with these rack-scale comparisons that AMD is modeling performance rather than publishing results from physical 100-kW racks containing both Venice and Vera hardware. The company describes the figures as estimates based on a combination of benchmark data and system-level assumptions, so they absolutely should not be treated as apples-to-apples measurements of shipping systems.

But AMD's also making a broader argument about the role of CPUs in agentic AI. Rather than treating the CPU as merely a host for an accelerator, the company says increasingly complex AI workflows require substantial CPU resources for orchestration, retrieval, database access, tool execution, networking, and response generation. The latest EPYC 9996 figures reinforce AMD's pitch for Venice as a high-core-count CPU designed to maximize useful work under real-world rack constraints rather than simply chasing peak processor performance.

Still, Vera is a more specialized CPU than Venice, and it has a very different architecture at the platform level. While these simulations put NVIDIA's new chip behind AMD's finest, NVIDIA claims the win in its own testing using different benchmarks and constraints. It's entirely possible that Vera may end up being a better choice for some workloads. We'll just have to wait for independent benchmarks on real hardware to know for sure.

AMD EPYC Venice is expected to outsell NVIDIA Vera by 2027... To make things even more exciting, a Morgan Stanley report predicts that AMD's EPYC Venice CPUs will reach 6.75 million units sold by next year—17% more than NVIDIA's Vera (and 5.4 times the volume compared to 2026).

According to reports, NVIDIA will remain TSMC's primary customer for CoWoS packaging capacity, with the Taiwanese company expected to reach a capacity of 200,000 wafers per month by 2027.

"Team Green" utilizes TSMC's CoWoS packaging solution for two main products: CoWoS-L for AI GPUs (such as Blackwell and Rubin) and CoWoS-R for Vera CPUs.

CoWoS-L production capacity is expected to reach approximately 910,000 units—a 40% year-over-year increase—while Vera shipments are projected to double. This would drive a 52% increase in revenue for NVIDIA compared to the previous year.

Finally, the report projects that NVIDIA's Vera CPUs will reach 5.75 million units by 2027. This is a significant figure for a new CPU launch, especially given NVIDIA's stated goal of becoming the leading CPU supplier by 2026.

Great news (for AMD)...The key takeaway is that NVIDIA is currently facing stiff competition. While its Vera processors are already in mass production at TSMC, the same applies to AMD's next-generation EPYC platform, codenamed Venice.

It is worth noting that Venice is based on the upcoming Zen 6 architecture, which is expected to deliver significant gains in performance and efficiency. As previously highlighted, the report projects that EPYC Venice CPUs will reach a volume of 6.75 million units—17% more than NVIDIA’s Vera (and 5.4 times the volume compared to 2026).

AMD is also utilizing TSMC’s advanced 2nm manufacturing process, whereas Vera is based on 3nm process technology. Furthermore, Vera is designed for agentic AI, while AMD’s EPYC Venice addresses both AI and HPC workloads.

The challenge at hand is not simply AMD versus NVIDIA or NVIDIA versus AMD, but rather the rise of custom silicon, as many AI companies are now venturing into that field.

Just this week, we reported that Google and MediaTek are collaborating on a chip that integrates CPU and AI capabilities into a single package for the next generation of intelligent agents. OpenAI and Amazon are also either in talks to produce or are already manufacturing custom chips, a trend that will intensify the debate between in-house development and external sourcing.

In short, with the growing popularity of custom chip manufacturing, NVIDIA, AMD, and other manufacturers may be facing a critical situation. While the demand for computing power remains high, AI companies producing their own chips will further exacerbate the supply-demand imbalance.

mundophone

 

TECH


What led two security researchers to leave Google DeepMind

There is a difference between an industry outsider warning that artificial intelligence could become dangerous and hearing the same concern from researchers hired to prevent that from happening. That is exactly what happened at Google DeepMind. Two experts focused on the safety of advanced systems left the company within a few months of each other. And the reasons they cited point to a problem that is far from being resolved.

Bilal Chughtai left Google DeepMind in July 2026. His work was directly related to the interpretability and safety of artificial general intelligence (AGI) systems, seeking to understand what occurs inside increasingly complex models.

After leaving, Chughtai began leading an AI safety program at the organization BlueDot Impact.

His concern is particularly serious, yet it must be understood as a personal risk assessment rather than a proven prediction. Chughtai stated his belief that AI systems could pose an existential risk and that the time available to avert extreme scenarios may be running out.

The core of his argument, however, lies elsewhere.

To him, the alignment problem—ensuring that highly capable systems remain consistent with the goals and boundaries set by their developers—remains unsolved.

At the same time, model capabilities continue to advance rapidly.

For this reason, Chughtai advocates for measures such as greater transparency and a more controlled pace of development, rather than a race to build increasingly powerful systems before sufficiently understanding how they work.

This is not a demonstration that AI will inevitably spiral out of control; rather, it is the assessment of someone who worked specifically on trying to figure out how to prevent such a scenario.

The second researcher chose to observe from the outside... A few weeks later, Josh Engels also left Google DeepMind’s AGI safety team.

His decision had a unique aspect: Engels stated that he had turned down offers from OpenAI and Anthropic to work at METR, an independent organization that evaluates advanced models, investigates incidents, and analyzes safety mechanisms. This choice reveals another concern.

Engels is particularly interested in so-called recursive self-improvement: the possibility of AI systems helping to develop even more capable versions of themselves, creating potentially ever-faster cycles of refinement.

The problem, according to him, is that there is currently no guarantee that sufficiently powerful systems would be safe before initiating such a process.

His estimate also drew attention due to its timeframe. Engels considers the possibility of AI systems causing “immense harm” within the next five years to be concerning, though he makes it clear that he cannot assign a precise probability to this scenario.

Once again, this is an individual assessment of a future risk, not a scientific conclusion establishing that this will necessarily happen.

Concern has mounted following incidents involving AI agents with greater autonomy.

In July, during internal cybersecurity evaluations, OpenAI reported that some models managed to bypass certain restrictions, access the internet, exploit vulnerabilities, and reach systems on the Hugging Face platform. The model involved was being used in internal research and was operating under specific evaluation conditions.

The episode does not demonstrate that an AI spontaneously developed its own intentions, nor does it confirm the extreme scenarios described by Chughtai and Engels.

But it does change the nature of certain questions.

Questions regarding autonomy, oversight, and the ability to keep a model within established limits cease to be merely theoretical exercises when experimental systems manage to bypass mechanisms designed to restrict their behavior.

And the departures of researchers concerned about this issue are not limited to Google DeepMind. Jacob Coxon, who also worked at OpenAI and Anthropic, has expressed similar concerns regarding the race to create systems capable of contributing to their own development.

The most curious detail lies in where they worked...The most significant aspect of this story is not simply that some researchers made pessimistic predictions about the future of artificial intelligence.

It is that they were part of the very teams responsible for studying these risks.

Chughtai worked on interpretability and safety. Engels was part of a team dedicated to AGI safety. Both left major labs and went on to advocate—in different ways—for a more cautious approach.

This does not prove that current systems are out of control, nor does it establish that catastrophic predictions will come to pass.

A second departure...Josh Engels worked alongside Chughtai on DeepMind's AGI safety team. He's an MIT graduate. He resigned on September 13, 2026, and turned down job offers from both OpenAI and Anthropic - two of the companies he'd be most likely to warn about. Instead he's joining METR, the independent nonprofit that evaluates whether frontier AI systems are dangerous before they ship. That's a deliberate choice. Engels told reporters he sees a "terrifying chance" that AI systems cause "immense harm" within the next five years, according to Business Standard. His fear is specific: capability gains outpacing anyone's ability to align or evaluate the systems producing them.

At METR, Engels says he'll trace where alignment failures actually originate in training, and test whether the safety mitigations labs already claim to have would hold up if something went wrong. That's not abstract. It's the difference between a company saying it has guardrails and someone independently checking whether those guardrails work.

More than boardroom talk...It's worth being precise about what this is and isn't. Earlier this month, Anthropic chief executive Dario Amodei publicly called for the AI industry to slow its pace, part of a broader run of leadership-level statements urging coordination among labs. Chughtai and Engels are a different animal entirely. Neither is a CEO making a strategic argument from the top. Both are individual researchers, inside Google's own frontier lab, walking out the door and saying, on the record, that they don't trust where the company they worked for is headed.

They're not alone, either. Jacob Coxon left OpenAI for Anthropic, then quit that job too, on September 9. He told colleagues the major labs are "racing to self-improving superintelligence and gambling with our lives," according to TheNextWeb. Three departures, three different companies, the same complaint: the pace of capability gains is outrunning anyone's ability to keep the systems controllable.

Chughtai's own ask is fairly specific. He wants AI companies to slow their competitive race, submit to real transparency, and coordinate on a pace "that society can handle," rather than one set by whichever lab is most afraid of falling behind. That's a harder sell than it sounds. Slow down unilaterally, and you've just handed the frontier to whichever rival didn't.

Google hasn't said much. A DeepMind spokesperson wasn't available to comment outside business hours when Chughtai's post went viral, according to TheNextWeb. That silence is its own kind of answer. Frankly, when two safety researchers from the same team leave within months of each other and neither departure gets a real public response, it says something about how the company is managing the story, whatever it's doing about the underlying concern.

None of this means DeepMind's alignment work has stalled, and neither Chughtai nor Engels claimed it had. What they're both saying, in slightly different words, is that the gap between what AI systems can do and what anyone can verify about their behavior is widening, not closing. Engels put a number on it: five years, "terrifying chance." Chughtai's timeline was vaguer. His verdict was blunter.

Not every departing employee gets this kind of hearing. These two did, because they left the inside of one of the world's most closely watched AI labs and said, in public, exactly what they were afraid of.

However, it reveals an increasingly significant tension in AI development: the capabilities of these models may advance at a different pace than our ability to fully understand, test, and control them.

It is precisely this disparity that turns artificial intelligence safety into a race against the technology's own pace of evolution.

mundophone        

Saturday, September 19, 2026

 

TECH


NVIDIA DLSS 5 mod runs in a browser and even works on Apple Silicon

If you've been fascinated by NVIDIA's DLSS 5 technology, yet lack the requisite hardware or necessary gumption to try it out for yourself, you can now see a live demo right on your PC, directly in your browser, without having to manually download or install anything. The demo works in your web browser, and it uses your GPU, but it doesn't run the DLSS 5 model in real-time, so you can get it to work on just about anything with the requisite WebGPU support.

A developer going by MAAN has demonstrated NVIDIA DLSS 5 Neural Rendering running inside a web browser using WebGPU, and according to their post on X, it works on macOS too. A live demo is up now, and MAAN says people can try it with their own models as well. This is odd because NVIDIA doesn't officially support DLSS through WebGL or WebGPU at all. DLSS normally runs through NVIDIA's NGX interface or the Streamline SDK, which sits between a game and DirectX or Vulkan and needs motion vectors, depth data, and the rendered frame handed over directly. None of that maps cleanly onto a browser's pipeline, so it's not clear which approach the developer has used to get it running on a web browser.

The developer hasn't shared technical details either, but they have confirmed that the source code will be shared on GitHub soon. Performance is another question mark. VideoCardz says loading the Neural Rendering model alone took a second or two on an RTX 4090, and running on Apple Silicon apparently works but isn't fast. That probably rules out real-time gaming for now, though the concept could still be useful for 3D model previews, where a slower response time matters less. It's an early proof of concept more than anything, but getting DLSS 5 working outside NVIDIA's own supported paths entirely is still a neat trick.

Created by a developer known as MAAN and spotted by Videocardz, this web implementation of DLSS 5 is little more than a model viewer that has the ability to apply the DLSS 5 neural filter to loaded models. It offers a chance to preview the look of DLSS 5 on most platforms, as unlike the official release (currently only available in NBA 2K27), it does not require a GeForce RTX 50 series graphics card. I was able to get the demo working on my ASUS ROG Flow z13 tablet with Radeon 8060S graphics, although it didn't load on my aging Snapdragon 888-powered smartphone.

That could have been down to the amount of memory required. The models that the site includes are pretty big, but the DLSS 5 neural network itself is the largest amount of the download, totaling nearly 150 MB by itself. This is pretty large for a website, and some devices may balk at the bulk. However, the developer notes that it works on MacOS, and in theory it should work on most devices with a compatible browser.

If you keep up with DLSS news, it should come as no surprise that the page is able to run the DLSS 5 neural filter on nearly any hardware, as it's not doing anything unique to NVIDIA's hardware. Indeed, modders have gotten DLSS 5 working on older GeForce hardware, AMD and Intel hardware (including integrated graphics), and even on video feeds with no 3D information. While DLSS 5 is AI-powered, it's mostly a post-processing filter, so you can apply it to nearly anything, and it can be run on nearly anything with a little tweaking.

As Whycry notes, the interesting part of MAAN's demo is how he's wired it up to the Three.js framework. NVIDIA doesn't offer WebGL or WebGPU as supported DLSS interfaces, which means the developer has either extracted the weights and reimplemented the network or created some kind of shim to use the leaked binary directly. In any case, it's impressive stuff, and you should check it out if you have a minute.

mundophone


TECH


Iran and China use AI agents to create fake social media profiles

Iran and China have used autonomous artificial intelligence agents to create and manage networks of fake accounts on platforms such as Instagram, Facebook, X, and TikTok. These operations were identified by U.S. authorities and security researchers.

The groups combined open-source Chinese AI models with agents capable of operating software and executing tasks independently. Hundreds of these systems were reportedly employed to open profiles, generate political posts, and coordinate messaging aimed at influencing opinions and stoking online debate.

These so-called AI agents differ from conventional chatbots because they are not limited to answering questions or generating text. They can be assigned a goal and execute a sequence of actions to achieve it—such as accessing a platform, filling out forms, creating accounts, and publishing content. In the identified campaigns, this technology reportedly allowed for the automation of virtually the entire process, from profile creation to message dissemination, with minimal human involvement.

According to a report by *The New York Times*, operators in most cases disabled the safeguards that would otherwise prevent the models from creating fake accounts or manipulating online discussions.

Based on the characteristics of these operations, U.S. authorities and cybersecurity experts attributed the Iranian and Chinese campaigns to initiatives linked to their respective governments. Two other similar operations, associated with Israel, were reportedly conducted by private companies.

The campaigns were considered technically rudimentary, and there is no indication that they achieved significant reach. Nevertheless, they drew the attention of intelligence agencies, technology companies, and researchers by demonstrating how autonomous agents can reduce the cost and effort required to maintain networks of fake profiles.

Operations of this type previously relied on teams tasked with creating accounts, drafting posts, and coordinating interactions. With AI agents, a smaller number of people can control hundreds of profiles and continuously produce content. The technology also makes it possible to rapidly adapt messages to different platforms, topics, and audiences. The discovery points to a new phase in digital influence campaigns. The risk lies not only in the production of fake text, images, or videos, but in the automation of the entire infrastructure needed to distribute these materials and create the appearance of spontaneous support for specific narratives. 

First time Chinese models were used like this...US officials told the NYT that these instances marked one of the first times AI agents from Chinese-produced models were used to handle every stage of an online influence campaign, from creating new fake accounts to coordinating messaging and framing online.

Unlike proprietary AI models, the open-source models were manipulated by developers to allow the agents to evade safeguards designed to verify users and prevent the manipulation of online discourse, the US officials added.

The US intelligence community, along with cybersecurity experts, looked into the groups behind the AI-powered campaigns and traced those efforts back to state-backed Chinese and Iranian groups, as well as to Israeli campaigns stemming from two private firms.

Kyle Crichton, a fellow at the Georgetown Center for Security and Emerging Technology who studies AI and cybersecurity, told the NYT that “Agent-led campaigns” will likely become more common as the technology spreads.

“Agents can be fairly sophisticated, and so in addition to just scale, they have an ability to blend in and look more like a human user,” he said.

The investigation was published in the wake of other major technology news, as AI leaders warned of the risks of developing AI too quickly and without proper safety measures. These warnings followed public concern over recent stories of AI models going rogue and hacking other companies.

In a report last month, Meta said it had seen a “technically significant development” of bad actors using AI for malicious purposes.

AI is now “embedded within automated systems that can produce, adapt, and distribute content with minimal human intervention,” Meta added.

The investigation also traced AI-agent campaigns back to Israel...The report mentioned that IntelEye, a Tel Aviv-based company founded by former NSO Group employees, operated roughly 1,000 AI-powered fake accounts on social media to manipulate political discourse around the upcoming Israeli elections.

The company used DeepSeek, a Chinese open-source AI model, to create its agents. According to the investigation, the bots then published content both supporting and opposing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

IntelEye disputed claims that its work was intended to influence online discussions, stating the company was conducting a defensive research experiment to expose weaknesses in AI systems.

“IntelEye does not operate influence campaigns,” co-founder Maor Sellek told the Times. “Our work with DeepSeek was conducted for defensive research and testing, to understand how models with insufficient safeguards could be misused and to improve detection of that activity.”

Sellek said IntelEye bought 10,000 social media accounts and handed over control to autonomous AI agents, though he added that only about 1,000 of the accounts were operational.

The agents used the accounts to leave comments on posts to boost engagement, although Sellek said they were not very successful.

Meta told the New York Times that the vast majority of the AI-powered agents set up on Facebook and Instagram by IntelEye, other companies, and state-backed groups had been removed by its automated detection and verification systems.

Networks of fake accounts...According to the publication, publicly available Chinese artificial intelligence models were used to create autonomous agents capable of performing online tasks. Hundreds of such agents were allegedly deployed to create networks of fake accounts on the American platforms Instagram, Facebook, X and TikTok.

The agents filled the accounts with posts about politics and current events, and also coordinated messages and online interactions. U.S. officials and cybersecurity researchers called this among the first known cases in which agents based on Chinese AI models were involved in almost the entire influence campaign process.

More current news is available on the UA.News Telegram channel Telegram. The operations were described as relatively primitive, but as demonstrating the possibility of automating tasks that previously required significant human involvement.

Iranian and Israeli operations...U.S. intelligence services, technology companies and security researchers investigated this activity and, according to The New York Times, linked the Chinese and Iranian operations to state-backed actors. Iranian AI accounts posed as ordinary Americans in major cities, shared popular memes, tagged journalists and politicians, and promoted views critical of the Republican Party.

Nearly 80,000 people followed these accounts in the first half of the year. The report also describes two Israeli campaigns linked to private companies. One of them, linked to the Tel Aviv-based company IntelEye, involved using AI agents to manage thousands of accounts and participate in discussions about upcoming elections in Israel. The company said it was a defensive research experiment to test the potential misuse of AI models.

Friday, September 18, 2026


TECH


Will AI Graduate from Tool to Lab Member? A Q&A with John Tsang

John Tsang, PhD, and his Yale lab members Jacob Kim and Ao Huang recently posed the question of whether AI immunologists are ready for prime time. Specifically, they were referring to large language models (LLMs) and whether they are as creative as humans in developing new hypotheses and methods for research in the field of immunology.

The answer, based on current studies, is no, not yet, says Tsang, Anthony N. Brady Professor of Immunobiology and professor of biomedical engineering at Yale School of Medicine. While there are functions where AI can be effective, such as summarizing relevant literature, LLMs like ChatGPT aren’t able to consistently generate truly original hypotheses, scientific ideas, or experimental approaches.

But, Tsang adds, researchers are exploring new ways of engaging LLMs that could overcome these current hurdles.

“I think there is a future—probably not too distant—where AI will be able to do such things,” says Tsang, founding director of the Yale Center for Systems and Engineering Immunology and an investigator with and the Yale lead for Biohub New York. “I see AI one day being a sort of team member, contributing ideas alongside scientists.”

We spoke to Tsang about the current state of what he calls AI immunologists and where he sees opportunities going forward.

John Tsang, PhD: An AI immunologist isn’t yet a robot that goes into the lab and does experiments. It’s an AI system that can think through concepts, propose hypotheses, suggest experiments, and interpret the data that come out of those experiments. That’s the kind of AI immunologist we’re talking about.

What do you mean when you refer to AI immunologists?

John Tsang, PhD: An AI immunologist isn’t yet a robot that goes into the lab and does experiments. It’s an AI system that can think through concepts, propose hypotheses, suggest experiments, and interpret the data that come out of those experiments. That’s the kind of AI immunologist we’re talking about.

How is AI capable in that regard now? What can it do well?

Tsang: What it can do really well is research the literature. For example, if you ask, “What's known about this molecule? What can that molecule do to this kind of cell?” AI can deliver excellent information. Basically, if you talk to any of these AI chatbots, things like Claude, Gemini, and ChatGPT, they're doing very well in this regard these days.

And where does AI still have room for improvement?

Tsang: AI is still not super effective at coming up with things that may be novel in the sense that AI may not be completely taking into account, for example, information from another field. If you don't prompt the AI and say, “Hey, have you thought about this particular knowledge in biochemistry or this particular thing over in aging? Do you think there's a connection between that and this principle?” it doesn’t do that on its own.

You note there are exciting opportunities when it comes to multi-agent approaches. Can you describe what these approaches are?

Tsang: When using AI in a classical way, you have one agent, and you have an interactive discussion with it. With a multi-agent approach, as a few research groups have now described, you ask different independent bots to take different roles. One bot could be a computational biologist, another one could be a biochemist, and yet another one could be someone who knows a lot about antibodies, for example. And then there's also a human who's involved in the team that can give the bots a high-level task and then let them talk to each other.

What is very interesting is that in examples of this type of approach so far, the majority of the interactions happen among the AI bots. The human doesn't necessarily go in and tell them what do. And researchers have found that the bots are capable of coming up with a work plan and executing it. Even when the human, while part of the team, is not doing the major coordination.

So that is quite interesting, suggesting that by having interactions among these bots—and I think the key is that they take on different roles—they are able to start to generate something that's quite emergent, not just straight answering. They can engage a multi-step plan and make decisions based on the data. That is, I think, quite intriguing.

One striking example is “The Virtual Lab,” a system developed by Biohub colleagues in which an AI principal investigator led a team of AI specialists—an immunologist, a computational biologist, and a machine learning expert—to design nanobodies (small antibody-like molecules) against a new SARS-CoV-2 variant. The team produced 92 candidate designs, and two were experimentally confirmed to bind the new variant. Notably, more than 98% of the words exchanged during the project came from the AI agents themselves; the human researcher set the goal and stayed in the loop, but the bulk of the back-and-forth largely happened among AI agents.

Would this type of approach help overcome some of the current limitations of AI?

Tsang: Yes, I think so. And I think it also overcomes what's called a context window problem. So each bot has a certain memory, and when you have a team like that, the total volume of memory becomes quite large. At the same time, the bots can start to write out answers to external files, which can get pulled back in again, extending memory further, in a way.

Another interesting thing that's emerging is what's called “world models.” So these are agents that have a much longer memory span, so they're not just working within this context window. They have external storage, and they try to provide a model of the world that the particular agent is in. I think that's also going to help.

Where do you think is the greatest potential when it comes to AI and immunology?

Tsang: I think the answer lies on two levels. First, I think it's going to be helpful in proposing and hypothesizing things that we haven't thought of yet. However, that will be based on existing data, and we still have limited data on lots of things in immunology.

For example, one project that I co-lead called the Human Immunome Project aims to capture human immunology variation across different people and across different populations. Now that kind of data simply doesn't exist yet. If you ask a chat bot or even multi-agents and say, "I know this vaccine works in the U.S. with this level of efficacy, what happens if I bring it to Tanzania?" it would have no idea because it simply doesn't have enough information and knowledge yet.

So that's where a different kind of AI, models like quantitative models of the human immune system, come in. That's another area that we are actively working on, how to develop that kind of model. Of course, once such models become available and useful, then AI agents can use them to query and answer the questions we ask.

Additionally, AI agents, I think, could form a team with us to work together on that problem, where we need to design experiments. We need to think about, given a certain number of resources and budget, what's the best first experiment, for example, what's the best first data collection exercise? Those are the kind of things that we are thinking about a lot.

How do these AI technologies intersect with education?

Tsang: I think we need to put these into education fairly quickly so students can understand how to use them and feel comfortable doing so. Plus, there are creative aspects, like the multi-agents and how to put them together.

I personally use these tools, especially when I’m starting something new. I want to get a sense of what’s known and also to potentially make novel connections. And my lab has discussed this sort of AI team approach.

Sometimes I think there's a bit of a worry about using AI to cheat, for example. That's what some educators may be thinking. But I think we have an opportunity to promote positive and productive use. And so the question is how to incorporate this technology in the most positive, effective way possible.

by: Mallory Locklear, PhD--Managing Editor—Science, Research, and Education

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